Federal agencies are facing a critical reckoning with cybersecurity. In the past year alone, high-profile breaches have exposed millions of Americans’ personal data, compromised sensitive intelligence
The systems that keep modern society running, such as water treatment plants, power grids, hospitals and factories, depend on a largely invisible layer of technology known as Operational Technology (OT). From controlling pumps and valves to regulating electrical breakers and industrial machinery, OT is the backbone of critical infrastructure. But much of this technology was built decades ago, when reliability mattered more than cybersecurity and connecting industrial systems to the internet was unheard of. Today, legacy OT systems have become a growing liability. As systems become increasingly connected, attackers are exploiting security gaps in the very technology that keeps essential services running.
In October 2026, the National Security Agency (NSA) published a Cybersecurity Information Sheet, Hardening Department of War Critical Operational Technology Environments with Zero Trust Principles. It is written for the Department of War (DoW) and the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), but the problems it describes are the same ones facing utilities, transportation agencies, water districts and manufacturers everywhere. This blog walks through what the guidance says, why it matters beyond the defense sector and how Keeper’s Privileged Access Management (PAM) capabilities can help organizations act on it.
Why OT needs a different playbook
The threat landscape outlined in the guidance is sobering. Volt Typhoon, a China-linked threat group, has spent years quietly establishing a foothold in U.S. critical infrastructure. Its attacks typically begin in IT networks, where compromised credentials allow attackers to move deeper into systems and potentially gain access to OT. The group often uses “living off the land” techniques, leveraging legitimate tools already installed on compromised systems to avoid detection.
Meanwhile, Iran-affiliated actors have targeted Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) in water and wastewater facilities by exploiting internet-exposed devices and default administrator passwords. These threats are not merely theoretical. In Minnesota, water systems have been targeted through remote monitoring and control systems, including PLCs, highlighting the real-world vulnerabilities facing critical infrastructure.
The lesson is that OT security cannot rely on the assumption that the traditional network perimeter will prevent attacks. A zero trust cybersecurity framework should be implemented so that no user, device or connection is trusted by default. Applied to OT, this means continuously verifying identities, limiting privilege, securing every remote connection and closely monitoring what happens inside the environment.
Applying zero trust to OT is harder than applying it to office IT, and the guidance is candid about why. Availability requirements may limit the ability to take systems offline for routine scanning or patching. Legacy controllers may lack encryption, modern authentication or the processing power to run security agents. And a security mistake can have physical consequences, so a tool that blocks the wrong command can inadvertently shut down a process.
What the NSA guidance recommends
The guidance draws on the Department of War’s broader zero trust framework, which contains 84 activities that collectively achieve comprehensive zero-trust capabilities. It highlights 26 high-impact ones that organizations can start on now, focused on wrapping legacy assets in compensating controls rather than replacing existing hardware. The following are key priority areas.
Secure remote access
Securing remote access starts with eliminating direct connections between OT networks and the public internet. Any remote access, including connections used by vendors and system integrators, should be routed through secure, identity-verified channels that require strong authentication and limit access to only what is necessary.
These connections should also be time-limited, continuously monitored and disabled once the work is complete. Because third-party access has been a common entry point in confirmed OT intrusions, the guidance emphasizes that vendor connections must be subject to the same level of security oversight and control as internal access.
Protect OT data
Integrity and authenticity matter as much as confidentiality in OT. Where legacy protocols can’t be encrypted, the guidance suggests secure gateways, tunnels or brokers that add protection around the device.
Inventory assets, accounts and applications
Organizations need a living inventory of devices, as well as the users, service accounts and shared accounts that touch them. The guidance notes that without this, you can’t establish a baseline for either security or operations.
Enhance visibility using threat intelligence
Relevant OT security data sources and telemetry feeds should be integrated into security monitoring capabilities, such as an OT-focused Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) solution, to improve threat visibility, event correlation and alerting.
Harden smart controllers
Default passwords should be changed on controllers, insecure services should be disabled and secure management protocols should be enabled where supported. Access should follow a least-privilege policy, with a clear separation between view-only and change permissions, and every configuration change should be logged.
Strengthen segmentation and monitoring
Networks should be divided by operational function and criticality, with firewalls and VLANs enforcing which communications are allowed, and monitoring should cover both human and non-human actors.
Secure engineering workstations and human-machine interfaces
These systems should be locked down, restricted to approved roles, logged thoroughly and protected from unauthorized software or scripts.
Harden Active Directory and domain controllers
Authentication infrastructure that serves OT users must be monitored and maintained. Tiered administration, least-privilege models and careful credential governance limit how far a compromised identity can travel.
Verify controls safely
Validation should rely first on passive methods such as configuration audits, log analysis and traffic monitoring. Active testing should happen only during approved maintenance windows, with extra care around sensitive devices.
Why this applies well beyond defense
Although the NSA document targets national security systems, its logic maps closely onto anyone running OT. A municipal water district, regional electric cooperative, hospital’s facilities network, airport’s baggage system and manufacturer’s plant floor all face the same mix of legacy devices, insecure remote access and lack of asset visibility. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) notes in its Adapting Zero Trust Principles to Operational Technology guide that any organization with OT can apply its recommendations.
For public sector and critical infrastructure leaders, the practical message is that you don’t need to wait for a full hardware refresh to make progress. Many of the highest-value steps are about identity, access and visibility.
If your organization is beginning this work, the NSA guidance suggests a sequence that is practical regardless of sector.
- Start with an honest inventory of the accounts, remote paths and vendor connections that touch your OT environment, because most intrusions begin there.
- Remove direct internet exposure and route remote access through mediated, recorded, time-bound paths.
- Rotate default and shared credentials on controllers and service accounts.
- Restrict standing administrator rights on engineering workstations and Human-Machine Interfaces (HMIs).
None of this requires stopping production. It requires treating identity and access as the control plane for OT, which is the core idea of zero trust.
Secure and simplify access in OT environments with KeeperPAM
A zero trust program has many essential components, and it’s important to combine them with privileged access controls rather than treating any one tool as a zero-trust solution. Keeper’s identity security platform addresses several of the NSA’s priorities directly, particularly those that revolve around who can access what, when access is granted and how that access is recorded. For maximum security, KeeperPAM can be deployed as either a cloud solution or a self-hosted solution via Self-Managed Keeper.
Remote and third-party access
KeeperPAM provides controlled, authenticated, monitored and auditable access to OT assets without broadly exposing the OT network or giving third parties unrestricted VPN access. Vendors can remotely connect to HMIs, PLCs and industrial systems in OT environments with zero-trust access. This corresponds to the guidance’s call for time-bound, monitored third-party access.
Least privilege and just-in-time access
KeeperPAM enforces Role-Based Access Controls (RBAC) and Just-In-Time (JIT) elevation for privileged accounts. Users receive administrator rights only when a task requires them, rather than holding them as standing privileges. This supports the NSA’s guidance on reducing standing privilege and denying by default.
Controller and service account credentials
Keeper can store credentials for controllers, service accounts and shared accounts, rotate them automatically and replace vendor default passwords. RBAC can help separate view-level from change-level access on controllers, which the guidance identifies as a basic least-privilege measure.
Visibility and telemetry
Keeper’s Advanced Reporting & Alerts Module (ARAM) provides comprehensive audit trails, SIEM integration and event-based alerting to help you maintain compliance, monitor risk and stop threats before they escalate. KeeperAI is layered in to enable real-time, agentic AI threat detection and response, ensuring that high-risk sessions are automatically terminated and all user activity is analyzed and categorized.
Domain administrator credentials
Keeper governs and rotates privileged domain administrator credentials and sessions, which limits lateral movement by a compromised identity.
Transform your OT operations
We know that OT environments face unique access and security challenges. Request a demo with our solutions team today to learn how Keeper can address these challenges and provide secure remote access for your OT environment.